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50,000 Voices Can't Be Wrong, But Courts Might Be:
How Chevron's Existence Contributes to
Retrenching the Higher Education Act
Twinette L. Johnson'
INTRODUCTION

In the Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale, The Emperor's New Clothes, a young
boy exposes an Emperor who, while dearly naked, parades around as if he is
wearing a magical garment of silk and spun gold. 2 The Emperor, who was known
to spend more time choosing his clothes than attending to state affairs, was
persuaded by clever robbers, masquerading as garment weavers, to purchase their
magical cloth and weaving services. The robbers told the Emperor that those who
are unfit for their office or unwise will be unable to see the magical cloth.
All the people of the Emperor's Kingdom and particularly those in the Big
Town heard about the magical cloth and the great expense the King was incurring
to have it weaved into a garment. They were especially intrigued by its purported
ability to separate the wise from the unwise. The Emperor himself became anxious
about the garment the cloth was being used to weave and wanted to know of its
progress. Not wanting to look at it himself, the Emperor sent his advisors to assess
the "weavers' progress. One by one, the advisors, who were unable to see the
garment, reported that it was magnificent, wonderful, and beautiful. Hearing these
reports, the Emperor decided to survey the garment. While the Emperor admitted
only to himself that he could not see the clothes, he allowed himself to be "dressed"
in them and paraded around, in front of all his subjects, as if he could. Better that
than to admit he could not see the clothes and be thought "unfit for his office" or
"unwise."
Those in the Emperor's court, including his attendants, could not see the
garments either, but they pretended they did lest they be thought unfit for office or
' Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Academic Success Programs, Southern Illinois
University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Scott Bauries and other members of the
Association of American Law Schools'("AALS") Section on Education Law for selecting me to present
this paper as a work in progress on the Section's 2015 conference panel entitled The Higher Education
Act at 50. I would also like to thank my fellow panelists, Professors Michael Olivas and Philip Schrag,
for influencing this piece through their presentations. Thanks to the audience participants for their
feedback, particularly Professors Eloise Pasachoff and John Rumel for their thoughtful questions and
comments. I am grateful to Professor Patricia McCubbin for her helpful guidance as I developed this
topic and Professor Steve Macias for his insightful comments on various drafts of this paper. Thanks to
Dr. Kenneth Warren for inspiring this paper through his teachings. Thanks also to my research
assistants Thomas Laye and Jenna Tucker for their dedicated and thorough research support.
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unwise. The people in the Big Town went along with it as well and why wouldn't
they? After all, they did not want to be thought of as fools. This went on for a
while as the Emperor paraded about, until one child, while watching the Emperor,
yelled out, "But the Emperor has nothing on at all!!!" 3 The child's father
acknowledged his child's statement and that statement was "whispered from one to
another until all knew and they cried out altogether, 'But he has nothing on at
all!!!" 4 At that point, the Emperor realized the people were speaking the truth.
But the Emperor did not admit his folly. He didn't even run off in shame.
Instead, the Emperor continued, believing that "the procession has started and it
must go on . . . ."s The tale ends by saying the Emperor's attendants ". . . held their

heads higher than ever and took greater trouble to pretend to hold up the train
which wasn't there at all."'
And so it goes with the deference scheme employed by courts with respect to
administrative agency action. While this deferential scheme is not exactly fool's
gold, in the world of judicial review of administrative decision making,
interpretations, and rulemaking, it can sometimes be a cloak that obscures actual
deliberation on salient issues presented by agency action. Removal of this
resistance cloak to deliberation, whether due to actual application of Chevron or
confusion as to when to apply it, is crucial to the survival of the undergirding policy
of super statutes.' Super statutes entrench within society an expectation of a certain
right not granted under the Constitution.' These entrenched statutes thus work to
fill these constitutional gaps but also to fulfill the proverbial contract made between
the people and legislators in promoting, codifying, and reauthorizing a right that
citizens deem essential to their personal and societal wellbeing.' The Higher
Education Act of 196510 (the "Act" or "HEA") is one such act. Promulgated in
1965 after an acknowledgement that wide spread post-secondary education access
was crucial to personal, societal, and economic survival, the Act sought to elevate
post-secondary education as the means by which citizens could lift themselves and
remain out of poverty.' 5
The Act, entrenched over the course of its existence, has maintained its policy
'Id. at 41.
Id. at 43.
' Id. at 44.
6 Id.
' See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 121 (2010) (stating that super statutes represent "statutory
constitutionalism ... that [has grown] out of ... social movement demands that government create
affirmative programs to regulate private as well as public institutions and behaviors"); Twinette L.
Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board: Re-entrenching the Higher Education Act to Restore Its
Historical Policy of Access, 45 U. TOL. L. REv. 543, 547 (2014) (stating that statutes become
entrenched and achieve "super" status "as society comes to expect and rely on the rights provided by
them").
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 121.
Id. at 6.
1o Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
" See Johnson, supra note 7, at 552; Erica R. Dines, The Higher Education Act of 1965, THIN
TWEED LINE (Mar. 17, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://www.humanstudy.org/students/2012-04-dines-e.html.
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of widespread access, but has become stymied in its approach. Plagued by
increasing financial aid costs, financial aid abuses in the private higher education
sector, and a push for financial belt tightening in tough economic times, Congress
and the Department of Education ("DOE") have twisted access into a preservation
of financial resources mantra and turned the historical access policy away from
creating new pathways to access. The legislation that proliferates today touts
maintenance of the Act's historical access policy through laborious accountability
standards tied to a post-secondary institution's eligibility to receive HEA Title IV
financial aid.' 2
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn offer a model that positions the normative
debate as an essential element of statutory entrenchment. After a statute is
promulgated in response to an issue in society, the statute is tested in the courts.
The new norm that comes out of that first stage is then implemented
administratively and by the courts with feedback from Congress. 4 There are then
attempts to narrow the statute which are met by the legislature capitulating to these
attempts by creating special interest exceptions." The court then follows suit by
narrowly construing the statute and the agency then promulgates regulations with
the regulated group or the special interest in mind.' 6 The public responds to this
attempted narrowing and stakeholders express their outrage to engage the public
more so in the cause.' Institutional opposition is fortified and politicians see an
opportunity to garner support for one side or the other in election battles.'" The
government then responds to this public debate by either reaffirming or modifying
the core principal of the statute." The cycle then continues.20
This article focuses on the normative debate aspect of the entrenchment
model - that aspect of entrenchment that takes its cue from the public in
responding to the narrowing of a statute. If the entrenched statute's goal is to
12 See Gabriel Serna, The "GainfulEmployment Rule" and Student Loan Defaults: How the Policy
Frame Overlooks Important Normative Implications, 44 J. Student Fin. Aid 69, 70 (2014) (describing
the DOE's focus on metrics supporting its gainful employment rules instead of the normative
implications associated with implementing the rule). The Higher Education Opportunity Act
("HEOA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012), has employed these accountability schemes in the name of fiscal
austerity. In fact, many legislators tout the public's request for fiscal austerity as support for such
legislation. See EDWARD P. ST. JOHN, REFINANCING THE COLLEGE DREAM 1 (2003) (forecasting
how public concern regarding taxpayer support of public education subsidies would result in further
reduction of those subsidies). They do so while ignoring the need for more credentialed workers and the
widening income gap amongst the country's poor and minority inhabitants. See Marilyn S. Thompson
et al., Understanding Differences in Postsecondary Educational Attainment: A Comparison of
Predictive Measures for Black and White Students, 75 J. NEGRO EDUC. 546, 546 (2006) (discussing
the "socioeconomic importance of post-secondary education" in the context of economic "changes in the
job market and in average earnings").
" William N. Eskridge &John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1270 (2001).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
" Id. at 1271.
20 Id.

19 Id.
20 Id.
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dismantle undesirable traditions for new norms, then the normative debate
represents the public's declaration of what the norm should be and the resultant
entrenched statute represents the protection of that norm over time. 2 1
In the 1960s, at the inception of the HEA, the public spoke loudly (through
advocacy and demonstrations) about what it desired from the government so that it
might better participate in society.22 The government heard and enacted ground
breaking welfare legislation in many areas impacting citizens' daily lives and their
ability to survive and prosper, including education. 23 New generations of those who
were helped by the HEA at its inception - the economically and socially
underrepresented - are victims of poor performing elementary schools and
secondary schools and unrealized post-secondary educational access promises.24
Today, the public continues to speak out about these deficiencies which permeate
the education sector.
But is anyone listening? The people call for elementary and secondary schools
which prepare students for meaningful post-secondary opportunities and the
workforce. They get busing, voucher systems, and selective charter school
constructs that help some but exclude too many to be considered responsive to the
education needs of the people. 25 The people call for access to post-secondary
opportunities that will allow them to fully function in society. They get a for-profit
school industry that victimizes the very people the HEA was devised to empower. 26
These initiatives, which have fallen short of their promised goals, pave the way for
the same government officials who championed their creation to declare them
21 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 189 ("The key to establishing a permanent new
federal program is building political . . . support to ensure that the interests [of the program's
proponents] ... are hard-wired ... into the program.").
' Johnson, supra note 7, at 557-58; see JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at 637-77 (1996) for a discussion of advocacy efforts during the 1960s.
23 See ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND His TIMES, 1961-1973, at
79 (1998) (welfare legislation included many acts that are entrenched today including the Civil Rights
Act, the Equal Employment Act, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act); Johnson, supra
note 7, at 552.
24 See generally Johnson, supra note 7, at 545 (stating that Title IV of the HEA was meant to
provide "a pathway for many students to attend a post-secondary institution, particularly those who are
socially and economically underrepresented").
25 See Ron Zimmer & Eric P. Bettinger, Beyond the Rhetoric: Surveying the Evidence on
Vouchers and Tax Credits, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY
447, 450 (Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske eds., 2008) (discussing voucher systems); James Forman,
Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging Evidence from Fifteen Years of a

Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 844-45 (discussing charter schools); Terry M.
Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557, 558
(discussing voucher systems); James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School

Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2051-58 (2002) (discussing busing mechanisms).
26 For a discussion of the inherent conflict in mixing the higher education provision with profit, see
Osamudia R. James, Predatory Ed: The Conlict Between the Public Good and For-ProfitHigher
Education, 38 J.C. &U.L. 45 (2011). James cites studies which demonstrate that for-profit institutions
derive the majority of their revenue from student tuition, id. at 88, thus making "student acquisition and
retention" and not "improving education" through instruction and support services their primary focus.

Id.
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threats to fiscal viability."7 When the people go back to their representatives calling
for change and improvement, the government shrouds these calls in "words, figures
and numerical data" that at best confuses and at worst obfuscates the real issue as
one of financial accountability instead of meaningful post-secondary access.28 The
result has been legislation such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 200129 and the
Higher Education Opportunity Acto which reauthorized the HEA in 2008.
These acts focus more on reporting and accountability than on encouraging and
enabling educators and other stakeholders to achieve widespread access through
new programs and incentives.
Given the current state, the judiciary must assume a greater role in the
normative debate by noting all aspects of what that process generates. Eskridge
and Ferejohn posit that statutory constitutionalism moves should be publicly
justified and debated through agency rulemaking and through formal congressional
action." They argue further that judges should be skeptical of and not defer to
agency action, which forces a collision between "super statutory evolution" and
"other fundamental norms, unless Congress, after deliberation and public feedback
has authorized such . . . [action]."32

But, extoling this reliance on Congress as the sole check on the very agencies it
forms, authorizes, and guides through legislation as the bedrock of judicial
interpretative deference is misplaced. While Congress is accountable to the voting
public, it is this accountability that distorts Congress' role as ultimate overseer of
agency action. Because politicians seek re-election and have their own agendas in
office, they are prone to obfuscation regarding the issues. 3 Thus, Congress alone
cannot ensure the people's will because the method by which one achieves
congressional office and carries on the business of that office often involves forming
and driving public opinion.
The judiciary, then, must acknowledge this by considering evidence of the
people's will.34 The judiciary is empowered by its very branch to do so because its
power is "the power of public opinion."as It thus maintains its credibility "by
27 See Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, 48 WORLD POL. 143, 147 (1996)
(describing "retrenchment advocates'" attempts to obfuscate the issues by making them hard for voters
to detect or by hiding those responsible for initially proposing the policy subject to retrenchment).
28 Jill Koyama & Brian Kania, When Transparency Obscures: The Political Spectacle of
Accountability, J. FOR CRITICAL EDUC. POL'Y STUD., Feb. 2014, at 143, 147.
29 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
'o Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
31 ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 289.
32 Id.
3 See Pierson, supra note 27, at 147 (as politicians work to retrench welfare benefits, they
assuage
politically crucial groups by promising to compensate those constituents for those lost benefits through
new reforms).
3 See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 29-52 (2004) which
describes social movements, interest group participation, litigation efforts, and law reviews and other
journals as methods by which the people express their will.
3s 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Francis Bowen rev., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1960) (1835).
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steering a course which fits within . . . [the bounds] of public opinion. "3 The

judiciary is impartial enough to be removed from forming or driving public opinion
and succumbing to interest group pressure, but accountable enough to ensure that
agency action remain compatible with the people's expectation of rights granted by
super statutes such as the HEA.3 1
But, through its use of Chevron deference, the judiciary has abdicated its role in
the normative debate associated with the HEA's entrenchment.3 ' Eskridge and
Ferejohn note that judicial review is not always the most effective institutional
response to administrative constitutionalism gone wrong, but judges do provide a
backstop for aggressive interpretations that go beyond legislative authorizations,
betray super statutory purposes, or fall athwart of larger normative commitments."
However, the courts' ability to be the "backstop" is compromised in areas where the
court uses the Chevron doctrine as a cloak of deference or excuse to be complicit in
Congress' unwillingness to develop the law in a way that meets citizens' true needs.
This is particularly troublesome when looking at the post-secondary education
landscape regulated by the HEA. Although the Chevron deference scheme has
expanded and narrowed over the years with respect to judicial review of agency
action,' it still remains available as a ready excuse for the lack of court involvement
in the normative debate. This is so because it does not consider the people's will in
determining whether an agency has acted within permissible limits of a super
statute. This threatens the entrenchment of the HEA and the policy supporting it
because it creates a roadblock, which prevents the people from being heard on the
issues. This article does not argue that the doctrine is detrimental to the Act's
entrenchment simply because of win and loss ratios. Rather, the Chevron doctrine
works to retrench the statute because issues, which come about in response to some
tension in the deliberative process and which citizens seek guidance on, are decided
without full review of how the DOE's action will impact the people. 4 1 The
judiciary then, by invoking Chevron, does not hear the people on issues, does not
offer substantive guidance as to how the Act (the codification of the people's right
claiming activity) 42 should operate, and thereby, instantly abdicates its role in the
normative debate.
36

DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 31.

supra note 35 ("The Supreme Court is all-powerful as long as the people
respect the law...."); but cE Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984) (stating that "judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do").
" See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).
39 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 24. Further, "judicial review might be the only
mechanism available for jump-starting institutions of public deliberation that are broken." Id. at 23.
' J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Varety with a Wink and a Nod to Chevron:
The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine ofJudicialReview ofAgency Interpretationsof Law,
36 J. LEGIS. 18, 19-20 (2010).
41
See Thomas Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L. J. 969, 997
(1992)(explaining, in the context of executive precedent, how Chevron "weakens the primary check on
agency abuses without any alternative")
42
Johnson, supra note 7, at 547.
.

3 See TOCQUEVILLE,
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This article will explore the judiciary's role in the normative debate generally
and as it relates to the HEA. It will also explore courts' use of the Chevron
doctrine and its impact on courts' participation in the normative debate. To that
end, Part I will describe the normative debate role within Eskridge's and Ferejohn's
super statute entrenchment model. In the context of higher education, this part
will also describe the people who participate in that debate and the ways in which
that participation impacts it. This will lay the foundation for understanding how
the normative debate has enabled the HEA's entrenchment and elevation to super
status. Additionally, defining the people, what they say, and how they say it, will
firmly establish the critical role the people play in influencing the evolution of a
super statute. Part II will address the court's role. This part will explore courts' use
of Chevron. It will demonstrate how the application and very existence of Chevron
deference impedes the debate regarding post-secondary access. Part III will argue
that the judiciary must include the people's will amongst its interpretive sources
when reviewing agency action regarding super statutes such as the HEA. In this
part, I join the chorus of scholars who have "shouted out" about the ineffectiveness
and inconsistency of Chevron. Setting this discussion, in the context of the HEA,
will prove that Chevron deference must be reimagined and readjusted lest the
historic legislative enactment, which sought to provide post-secondary access to
those most underserved, be retrenched.
I. BIG TOWN SPEAK: ACKNOWLEDGING THE ROLE AND POWER OF THE
NORMATIVE DEBATE IN INFLUENCING SUPER STATUTE INTERPRETATION

The normative debate is the "ongoing deliberative process by which small "c"
43
constitutional norms and institutions become entrenched in . . . [the] polity.
According to Eskridge and Ferejohn, this process of "[d]eliberation should be
complicated, polycentric, experimental, forward-looking . . . [and] problem

solving."44 The process is an interactive one by which the accountable organs of
governance decide what to do. 45 "[T]he primary actors" (meaning those who can
actually affect these "rights" through legislative authorization and reauthorization)
are "legislators, executive officials and administrators . . . ."46 However, "the
ultimate . . . political agency is found in [the] . . . [p]eople acting through regular
elections and the associated devices of political parties, . . . political associations ...

and popular social movements." 47
A. The GreatDebate
One of the hallmarks of statutory entrenchment deliberation is that it is not
43 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 13.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 15.
* Id. at 1.
4
4s

47

d
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front loaded like big "C" Constitutional deliberation.4 8 Article V of the U.S.
Constitution requires a deliberative process to ensure wide support for proposed'
Constitutional change. 49 It requires that both Congress and three-quarters of the
state legislature agree to Constitutional amendments." The purpose of the
Constitution is to entrench certain institutions and rights against any easy change.'
This form of "right creation" is albatross-like and inefficient in its response to the
public's urgent demand for recognition and practical application of a right deemed
central to preservation, sustenance, and improvement of Americans." An issue
then arises as to the best institutional means to make entrenched and oft general
goals of the Constitution practical and real for the people." In other words, how
can the people gain more immediate access to these critical rights and still be
ensured that they are products of creation and maintenance systems that truly
capture and represent the people's will?54 This paves the way for super statutes. 5
Elevating a statute to a super statute through entrenchment is not only about
status, but also about function." The deliberative process informs the practical
application of the statute as much as it entrenches the statute. The entrenched
statute thus enjoys super statute status because of the ongoing debate. This is not
the Article V Constitutional amendment process that is front loaded and requires
legislators to commit to a norm before they know whether it works substantively
and institutionally.57 This deliberation influences and shapes specific solutions and
over the course of the deliberation, as the statute expands and contracts to meet the
people's needs, a norm arises and plants itself amongst those rights citizens deem
important and necessary for functioning in society. Thus, regarding the HEA, the
point made is not to dissuade change. The debate is needed to make those changes
that would help the people of today achieve the same goal the people achieved
when the Act was first enacted." In the HEA's case, that is wide-spread access to
post-secondary education opportunities.
That is the role of an entrenched
statute - to preserve over time the right embodied in the statute." That
embodiment proves that the right is not one which the proponents of the statute
believe would wear out over time or become unfashionable.o Rather, the right is
4s

See id. at 16.

49 Id.
50

Id.

s Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions:A Research
Agenda, 10 J. CONST. L. 399, 401 (2008).
52 Id. at 399 (comparing changing the Constitution to "running the gauntlet of Article V").
" Id. at 408.
54 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 17 (describing the efficacy of using the super
statutory model to change "fundamental institutional structures and normative commitments").
s ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 16.
s' But cfYoung, supra note 51, at 405 (arguing that statutes do not have to be deemed "super" to
denote a constitutive function and "that decoupling entrenchment and constitutive functions eliminates
[a need for] a precise rule ... for extra canonical norms").
s7 ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 16.
s Johnson, supra note 7, at 549.
o Id.

' See id. at 558 (describing President Lyndon Johnson's desire to establish the HEA as a legislative
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something that would be an indelible mark on the American people and should be
preserved throughout time. The normative debate then seeks only to determine
the new ways in which the right would be conferred to Americans as society
changes. Thus, the right does not change - only the means by which it is delivered
to the people."1
What Americans rely on today is a working constitution that addresses its needs
and desires. That transpires through statutory constitutionalism in the form of
entrenched statutes. These statutes are thus more than Constitutional gap fillers
and are in fact transformative.6 2 The deliberation process affords this with regard
to super statute development because it "occurs over time in a series of episodes
rather than one big Constitutional poll."" Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that
"preferences as to fundamental (constitutional) norms are endogenous." 64 They are
a product of a powerful deliberation and feedback loop where the deliberating
actors (using their various forms of pressure and compromising according to their
65
various forms of accountability) address and advocate for reaffirming the statute.
This constant maintenance of the statute, through the normative debate process
(which includes the people's will), is what eventually entrenches a statute and with
66
regard to the HEA, is what has sustained it from its enactment in 1965 to now.
B. The People's "Speak"
The dialogic nature of the normative debate process features diverse
participants who are open to different viewpoints.6 1 "Congress, the White House,
government agencies, interest groups, the general public, and states . . ." all play a

role.6' The players address issues in a complicated interplay that involves agencies
providing information about an issue while legislators balance incommensurable
values and create compromises as well as new governmental structures and
programs to deal with the matter.6 ' The judiciary participates by fitting and
sometimes evaluating those legislative directives and agency rules in light of the
0
nation's larger body of law.7
The people speak on a problem in various ways - from participation in elections
act that would be "an entrenching and enduring guide" for providing higher education access).
61 See id. at 559 (describing the HEA as "that legislation that would again and again reinforce the
power of education to set the country on the path to addressing systemic inequities amongst citizens").
62 ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 6.
63 Id. at 17.
* Id. at 189.
6s See id. at 23, 189-190.
66 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 28 (describing how the deliberative process
entrenches a societal normal by creating network effects that build "consensus around the rule,
suggesting reasons why various groups will benefit from it, and associating even perceived rule violation
with bad consequences").
67 ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 15.
68 DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 29.
69

ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 15.

70 Id.
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and political parties to involvement in interest groups and social movements. This
participation can be the direct result of many things including elite stimulus,
political interest, civic duty, political association, rational thought, and political
factors to name a few." This participation thus generates a "speak" composed of a
body of preferences, desires, and beliefs on a given problem that represents the
collective will of the people. "The Constitution's framers recognized that public
opinion would shape constitutional discourse . . . and that ... [the] written
constitution could never trump the will of the people."72 Laws thus are based on
the people's will and must keep up with shifts that are endemic of the times." The
"speak" then, as it represents the people's will with respect to a desired norm,
should thus be considered by a court when determining if an agency has acted in
accordance with the statute and its underlying policy. The very existence of
Chevron creates the possibility that the people's will could be discarded and
assumes a system completely intact as to the representation of that will without any

need for check by the courts. The study of legislation, whether it is prompted by a
direct claim about a statute's meaning or allowance or a claim regarding the power
of an agency, must begin with the study of the social condition.74 Thus, "[w]hen
the Court ... " does engage in interpretive exercises, it should have "...plenty of

company." 5
1.

The People Speak Through Their Electing Power.-"[C]onstitutional

democracy . . . demands leaders ...

chosen by majorities and ...

subject[ed] to

specific normative guidance [from those majorities] as to which norms and rights
are constitutionally sacred . . . ."" But that democratic constitutionalism construct
is threatened by political machinations that cast into doubt reliance on the election
process to demonstrate the people's will.n While political leaders also participate in
the normative debate, in attempting to retrench welfare reforms, that participation
can operate to obfuscate the people's true desires by refraining or reformulating the
people's "speak" into an election winning cause." This article does not argue that
71

KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING AND

PARTICIPATION IN

.

AMERICA 4, 18-20 (1999).
72 DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 30.
7 Id. at 29 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168
(1949) in which Justice Cardozo stated that "the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men
do not turn aside in their course and pass ... judges by").
74
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 57.
7s DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 29.
7
6ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 2 ("[D]emocratic constitutionalism requires . .
popular choice of political leaders, a normative hierarchy embodying substantive rights, and institutions
and procedures for enforcing the hierarchy and at least some of the rights.").
n Overreliance on majority-vote constructs ignore the true makeup of society and the problems that
may impact minorities and others who may not have the platform to make themselves heard on the
issues. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 4, 18-20, for a discussion of the various things that impact the
people's ability to participate, including what the author refers to as "elite stimulus."
n See generaly Pierson, supra note 27, at 145 (describing retrenchment of welfare reform as "a
delicate effort either to transform programmatic change into an electorally attractive proposition, or at
the least, to minimize the political costs involved").
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the election process is unworthy of determining and representing what the people
want. In fact, a statute's entrenchment is a response to the government's own
electorate." Elections offer citizens the opportunity to assess the social condition,
demand changes, and to hear from politicians how those demands might be met.
But this very aspect of the process leaves the people and their will open to
manipulation. That the elected officials are enacting legislation that addresses a
certain problem does not always mean that the problem is one the people (not just
the voting majority) are in most need of solving.
In the higher education sector, increasing higher education costs continue to be
a great source of debate and concern amongst the people and their political
representatives alike.s The people want higher education access for themselves
and their children and the government wants to monitor and, in some cases, limit
the role it plays in providing that access." These are not new concerns.82 In 1968,
Myron Brenton wrote, in the New York Times Magazine, that comfortable,
middle-class families were writing their Congressmen with their concern about
how they would send their children to college." A significant increase in the
number of students desiring to attend college and changes in socio-economic
conditions during that time caused a shift in attitudes regarding higher education."4
Whereas in the past, a high school diploma would credential a citizen enough to
earn a comfortable living," by this time, the bachelor's degree had become almost
"an indispensable requirement for even moderate success in job or career." 6 This
social condition made higher education seem less like "a privilege and more like a
right" that citizens expected access to in reaching their full potential." Even
though higher education was becoming more of an expected right, the historically
disadvantaged were not enrolled in large numbers despite scholarships and
" But cf Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Pivate Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011) (arguing against entrenchment of ordinary statutes
because doing so actually impedes the government's ability to be democratically responsive to its
electorate).
* See ST. JOHN, supra note 12, for a discussion of how concerns regarding higher education costs
and the responsibility for meeting them, across political and socioeconomic strata, have impacted laws,
regulations, and the entire financing system regarding higher education.
81 See ST. JOHN, supra note 12, at 1, 4 (describing the shift in federal student aid from a primarily
government funded grant system to a complicated loan system which requires students and their families
to shoulder the majority of education costs). For a detailed discussion of the policy shift regarding
financial aid, see ST. JOHN, supra note 12, at 100-27.
82 Id.
" Myron Brenton, The Higher Cost of Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1968, § 6
(Magazine), at 32.
8 Id.
* See ANGELICA CERVANTES ET AL., TG RESEARCH & ANALYTICAL SERVS., OPENING THE
DOORS TO HIGHER EDUCATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 40 YEARS

LATER 18 (2005), available athttp://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED542500.pdf.
86 Brenton, supra note 83; see also Thomas Brock, Young Adults and Higher Education: Barriers
and Breakthroughs to Success, TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD, Spring 2010, at 109, 110-11,
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/20_01_06.pdf.
" Brenton, supra note 83.
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programs designed to help them." African-Americans, for example, accounted for
only 4.6 percent of enrolled college students." In fact, while middle class parents
complained about increasing costs and their inability to secure adequate aid to send
their children to college, low income families struggled also in securing aid for their
children." This strong focus on fiscal shortfalls by both families and higher
education institutions set a course for a shift in the method by which legislators
(elected officials) approached upholding the wide spread access policy under the
HEA. While the Act's earlier reauthorizations continued to expand access through
grants and pre-college encouragement programs, by the late 70s and through the
80s, student loans became the key method by which access was expanded."
Politicians played on the people's fear of losing financial aid or having it run out
and were able to turn the focus from costly creation of new programs for access to
protection of existing federal funds. 9 2 This was evidenced by the decrease in grant
programs and increase in loan programs.93
Today, similar claims are made with respect to the government's ever growing
financial aid burden. The for-profit higher education sector is often trotted out as
an example of abuse and mismanagement of the federal financial aid funds it has
access to.94 Reports of increased loan debt load, significant loan defaults, and lack
of gainful employment opportunities for students at these institutions serve as
potent evidence that the sector deserves the criticism and additional regulation it is
subjected to.9s Many for-profit institutions act so egregiously that the sector has
become the "poster child" for Title IV federal financial aid funds abuse." Given
this, the people can't help but champion campaigning politicians who promise to
rid the sector of the bad actors thus saving the people's tax dollars. The politicians'
"shift in goals and context [thus] creates new politics" which provides a path for
escaping blame." In the process, the politicians create new platforms that
seemingly speak to the problems but in reality obfuscate the true issues by focusing

88 Id.

89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See ST. JOHN, supra note 12, at 101 (Politicians attack higher education institutions calling them
inefficient, expensive, and abusive of federal financial aid funds). St. John argues that politicians use
"spin control" on these issues to influence "the popular press and public attitudes about higher education
finance." Id. This spin control contributed to obfuscation regarding the erosion in federal grants and the
new emphasis on loans. Id.; see Johnson, supra note 7, at 562-566 for a discussion of student loan
expansion over the course of later HEA reauthorizations.
92 See generaly ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 189-92 (discussing the tactics used to
encourage the public to change its approach to social security and the resultant difficulty in establishing
the change amongst citizens).
9
Johnson, supra note 7, at 563-64.
* Serna, supra note 12, at 70.
"sRyan
Randazza,
For-Profit
Colleges
Bilking
Public,
Senator
Says,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/story/2012-07-31/for-profit-colleges/56603382/1
(2012) (describing a United States' Senator's report on the ills of for-profit institutions).
96
Ide

" Pierson, supra note 27, at 147.
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on ones that would entice a majority to vote in their favor during elections." The
people thus get voluminous accountability standards that seek to tamp out the
fund-abusing behavior, but get little in the way of new programming that would
allow citizens increased access to reputable higher education institutions.9 9
For instance, in 2011, the DOE began making rules "that would define gainful
employment and . . . limit the amount of debt students enrolled in for-profit or
vocational schools could incur....""' The rules largely employ economic measures

to determine whether a for-profit school's students have exceeded the allowable
debt level. 10' Reports of federal student loans used to pay exorbitant tuition
expenses at for-profit institutions 1 02 as well as reports that students from these
schools cannot secure jobs adequate to repay their school debt'03 (while true) serve
s See id.

* But see Fred M. Hechinger, Taking the Politics Out of 'Open Access,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1970, at E13 in which Hechinger suggested an open college admissions system to address the education
needs of disadvantaged youth who might not be academically prepared for traditional schools. The
proposed system did not grant students their choice of schools, but did entitle them to attend at least
some post-secondary institution. Id. Hechinger's proposal demonstrated a concern about meeting
disadvantaged students' higher education needs and perhaps foreshadowed for-profits schools' expanded
entry into the higher education sector to meet those needs. See generallyJames Coleman and Richard
Vedder, For-Profit Education in the United States: A Primer 5, Center for College Affordability and
Production, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED536281.pdf (noting the circumstances surrounding the
1972 HEA reauthorization which broadened for-profit institutions' access to federal financial aid
funds).
Almost forty-five years later, in 2015, President Obama proposed a similar access granting idea by
specifically recasting the community college system (and not the for-profit industry) as the vehicle for
spreading post-secondary access. Kyla Calvert, Obama: Community College Should be as Free and
Universal in America as High School, PBS NEWS HOUR, January 20, 2015. President Obama's plan
would elevate access to college as a societal norm in the same way high school had been elevated in the
1920s. See CERVANTES ET AL, supra note 85, at 18; cf Judith Scott-Clayton & Thomas Bailey, The
Problem with Obama's "Free Community College" Proposal, TIME (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://time.com/money/3674033/obama-free-college-plan-problems/#money/3674033/obama-freecollege-plan-problems/, January 20, 2015 (criticizing the plan for not addressing broader barriers to
access and not providing resources to improve community colleges so they can meet the quality
standards set by the plan).
Hechinger's open college admissions system and Obama's free access to community college plan
seem to implicate the for-profit sector in providing or hindering access, respectively.
10 Serna, supra note 12, at 69-70.
sox Id. at 70-71.
102 Walter Hamilton, For Profit Colleges Face a Federal Crackdown, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/06/business/la-fi-for-profit-colleges-20110206/3.
1o3 See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, For-Profit Colleges Leave
African-American and Latino Students with Poor Educational Outcomes, Unmanageable Debt (Oct. 3,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/For-profit-colleges2014),
leave-African-American-and-Latino-students-with-poor-educational-outcomes-unmanageabledebt.html (stating that students of color enroll in for-profit institutions at higher rates than other
students and are more likely to borrow, and borrow more, for their education than their peers at public
and private institutions).
According to a statement made by Education Secretary Arne Duncan, in 2008, the loan default rate
for students graduating from for-profit institutions rose from 11 to 11.6 percent while public and private
institutions' loan default rates rose from 5.9 to 6 and 3.7 to 4, respectively. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., Student Loan Default Rates Increase (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/student-loan-default-rates-increase-0. Even though student loan default rates are lower for the
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as the perfect platform for politicians seeking to scale back government spending
on financial aid. According to Gabriel Serna, "much of the language in the
[gainful employment] rule is aimed at defining gainful employment by
operationalizing the problem as an issue with 'tax payer burden' in terms of
default."1 04 This purely economic approach misses important aspects of what
normally contributes to student loan defaults amongst the typical for-profit
institution student.10 Students' individual circumstances such as their existing
socio-economic condition may influence their ability to manage funds and
inadequate preparation at the elementary and secondary level may impact a
student's ability to access or complete post-secondary education.10 6 Politicians thus
shift the discussion from wide spread education access to fiscal responsibility while
simultaneously securing for themselves votes from those who have been convinced
that such action will save access.o In shifting the discussion from access to fund
protection, politicians have, with the same narrow stroke, confused, obfuscated,
and marginalized important societal issues in place of "election worthy" issues and
have made the students most needing protection even more susceptible to the
unscrupulous tactics employed by some for profit schools.o'
2. The People Speak Through Participationin Interest Groups and Social
Movements.-The very process of statutory entrenchment transforms the nature of

interest groups and social movements.' 09 As statutes mature through the
entrenchment process, social programs develop new bases of organized support.o

first time in several years, there remains a large percentage of for-profit college graduates who defaulted.
See Allie Bidwell, Student Loan Default Rate Drops 7 Percent in One Year, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 24,
2014,
11:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/24/student-loan-default-ratedecreases-but-some-question-federal-free-passes. Between 2011 and 2013, 44 percent of the students
who defaulted on their student loans were from for-profit colleges even though for-profit colleges only
enroll 22 percent of all college students. Id.
" Serna, supra note 12, at 76 (arguing that framing gainful employment policy as a consumer
protection issue incorrectly focuses on student loan default metrics instead of societal issues most likely
correlated with higher levels of debt burden and default).
10s Id.
10' Id. at 76-77.
10' See e.g. ESKRIDGE

& FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 203 (describing conservatives' attempts to
weaken the public's certainty that they were entitled to social security benefits "while simultaneously
increasing their certainty in and exposure to the alternative").
tosLobbyists can also influence political issue formation. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 3. Goldstein
describes grass roots lobbying as "[tihe identification, recruitment, and mobilization of
constituent-based political strength capable of influencing political decisions." Id. Although lobbyists
participate in the speak by generating information that can influence law and therefore the
interpretation of it, lobbyists also work to "signal legislators on the electoral consequences of their
actions and provide information to constituents that may reframe an issue or ... change mass opinion."
Id. at 4. This does not operate then as a scheme to capture people's will, but to manipulate public
opinion to achieve certain electoral results potentially through obfuscation or other means. See David
Halperin, The Perfect Lobby: How One Industry Captured Washington, D.C., The Nation,
http://www.thenation.com/article/179161/perfect-lobby-how-one-industry-captured-washington-dc
(discussing the impact of lobbying on the growth of the for-profit higher education sector).
1o9 Pierson, supra note 27,
at 147.
10 See id. at 151.
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Groups mobilize and form to establish the importance of statutorily codifying a
right or to defend against an existing statute's retrenchment."' "Public attitudes
and preferences are often funneled through individuals and groups that press their
constitutional agendas on Congress, the executive branch, and the courts."112
One such group, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, created a Legal Defense and Educational Fund to systematize litigation as a
tool to gain important rights for African Americans." 3 In conjunction with the
fund, Charles Houston, then Dean of Howard Law School, sought to build a social
movement that would marry "the emerging black insurgency with civil rights
litigation" in attacking segregation.114 He wanted to take advantage of any judicial
activism and connect formally and strategically the legal struggle with the
burgeoning Black Freedom Struggle. 1 s
In the landmark school desegregation case, Brown v. Board ofEducation,"6 the
legal team for the plaintiffs, arguing against school segregation, introduced as
evidence psychological studies showing the impact of segregation on children. 1 7
The goal in using the studies was to emphasize that separate but equal did not
ameliorate or avoid the psychological damage to children, during their formative
years, caused by segregation."' Segregation was not just about separation but also
about "the perpetuation of subordination" and stereotypical beliefs about the
"intellectual inferiority of Afr[ican] Americans.""
The team introduced a
well-known study conducted by Kenneth and Mamie Clark.'20 The study
"examined the psychological ... [impact] of segregated and racially mixed schools

&

nI See e.g. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 34 - 35 (describing various interest groups such as
the American Civil Liberties Union which has used its influence to "expand constitutional guarantees"
on many issues including rights for gays and lesbians).
112 DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 34 (describing how the National Consumers' League
advocated for reforms that would normalize protections for factory workers through legislation and the
courts and how "the American Liberty League was organized by conservative businessman to challenge"
those reforms).
u1 DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 35.
114 Waldo E. Martin, Jr., Introduction to BROWN V. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, at xv, xvii-xviii (Leon Friedman ed., 2004).
us Id. In the latter part of the 60s and throughout the 70s, spurred on by the gains made during
President Johnson's Great Society efforts, more people began to coalesce around people of shared
interests and formed groups to advocate for their rights. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND
EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 638-641 (1996). These groups often turned to
litigation to advance their rights. Id. This litigation approach was adopted by other groups (such as
environmental and women's groups) as they sought to advance their social policy objectives. DEVINS
FISHER, supra note 34, at 35.
116 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown is a United States Supreme Court case that consolidated three
school desegregation cases on direct appeal to the Supreme Court from their respective district courts.

The three consolidated cases were Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. South Carolina 1952),
Davis v. City Bd. ofPrince Edward Cnry. Va., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), and Brown et al. v.
Board ofEd. ofTopeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1955).
117 ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 125 (2003).
us Id. at 123.
119 Id.
120

Id. at 124.
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on black children."1 2' Children (ranging in ages from three to seven) were shown
four dolls - two where brown and two were white.1 22 The children were asked to
identify the race of each doll and then were asked to respond to a series of
commands regarding the dolls.1 23 They were asked to choose the doll they wanted
to play with.1 24 They were also asked to identify the nice doll, the bad doll, and the
doll that was a nice color.125 The study indicated that the black children picked the
white dolls when asked what doll they would like to play with, what doll was nice,
and what doll had a nice color.1 26 They only picked the black doll with regularity
when asked to identify the bad doll.1 27 "The Clarks concluded that the studies
indicated self-rejection, one of the negative effects of racism on children at the early
stages of their development."1 28 The team wanted "the judges to grapple with ...
[this] reality of segregation" and thought the expert testimony on the matter would
force the judges to decide whether they would continue on in "spurious
rationalizations" of segregation or "enforce the Fourteenth Amendment" in the way
that it was meant to be enforced - to ensure true equality.1 29
Though Brown did not question agency action and a court's willingness to defer
to it per se, it does highlight the perils of not considering the social condition and
the public opinion which accompanies it when deciding an issue. Even though the
plaintiffs' lawyers presented hours of testimony on compelling information
regarding the effects of segregation on black children, the lower court's opinion did
not address these concerns. 30 In its majority opinion, the lower court noted that
the issues raised by the studies were ones of legislative policy that the court could
not interfere with."' The Court ruled that segregation was the law and that Plessy
v. Ferguson'3 2 had made it permissible."' The court's only action was to rule that
black students were entitled to equal education facilities - not integrated." 4
Integration was not ordered until the United States Supreme Court ruling in
Brown which held, in the face of Plessy, that "separate educational facilities were
inherently unequal."" 5 In making the decision that segregating students based
solely on race deprives minority children of equal education opportunities, the court
relied heavily on the history of the separate but equal doctrine - from Plessy
through later education cases such as Sweat v. Painter, et al.,"' and McLaurin v.

125

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

126

Id.

121
122

123
124

121

Id.
Id. at 125.

129

Id.

127

`0 Id. at 126-27
"' Id. at 127.
132 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (holding that separate but equal facilities
were legal).
113 CoTrROL, ET AL., supra note 117, at 127.
134 Id.
131 Id. at 150 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)).
136 See generaly339U.S. 629 (1950).
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Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,'7 which declared separate but
equal higher education systems unconstitutional under the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 ' The Supreme Court also relied heavily on the
Clark study in ruling that separate but equal creates within children "a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in ways unlikely to ever be undone."" 9 Separate but equal may have been
the law of the land and courts may have determined that policy regarding
segregation was the province of the legislature, but the Supreme Court in Brown
could not ignore the social condition, the people's will regarding it, and the role the
law should play in seeing that will realized.' 40
According to Tocqueville,

'

[the s]ocial condition is commonly the result of circumstances, sometimes of laws,
oftener still of these two causes united; but when once established, it may justly be
considered as itself the source of almost all the laws, the usages, and the ideas
which regulate the conduct of nations: whatever it does not produce, it
modifies. 14

Interest groups also advance their agendas by publicizing "their findings and
conclusions about important public matters ...

in articles, books, ...

commission

"' See generally339U.S. 637 (1950).

us COTT'ROL, ET AL., supra note 117, at 149-50.
Id. at 127 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)).
'" The Court noted that it could not turn back the dock to when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted or to when Plessey was decided. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 (1954). The Court
said that it "must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the nation." Id.
The death penalty debate serves as another example of how public opinion swayed the judiciary in
declaring a moratorium on the practice. See DEVINS &FISHER, supra note 34, at 30-32 for a discussion
of the Supreme Court's treatment of death penalty cases from 1972 through 1997 where the Court
reversed the death penalty in Texas and Georgia declaring it cruel and unusual due to the "erratic
nature" of the penalty's application and held that "cruel and unusual punishment requires a flexible
analysis ... [recognizing] that as public opinion changes, the validity of the penalty would have to be
re-examined." In 1997, the Court found it unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded and to have
judges instead of juries impose the death penalty. Id. The Court did not look to the text of the
Constitution, the framers' intent, or its own precedent in reaching its decision, but relied on a "national
consensus" that had developed against such executions. Id. Even though the states reinstated the death
penalty with changes that addressed the Court's concerns after the moratorium, id., reports today
indicate that the death penalty imposition continues to decline with "U]ust three states - Texas,
Missouri and Florida - account[ing] for ... [eighty] percent of the total [executions)." Mark Sherman,
New
Death
Sentences,
Executions
Continued
to
Drop
in
2014,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3a37al5f20e44b2f95662f8c58a2c307/executions-new-death-sentencescontinue-fall (2014). While polls tend to show that Americans still favor the death penalty, concerns
over executing innocent people, botched executions, and arbitrary death sentences have put executions
on hold in many states. Michael Walsh, New Death Sentences, Executions Continued to Drop in 2014,
Report Says, http://news.yahoo.c6m/new-death-sentences--executions-continued-to-drop-in-2014-report-says-214248073.html (2014).
The movement to abolish slavery also found its roots in public advocacy. DEVINS & FISHER, supra
note 34, at 32 (noting that "[t]he essential antislavery documents were private writings and speeches, not
court decisions or legislative statutes").
141 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
35, at 57.
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reports[,]"142 and amicus briefs.' 4 3 In supporting the use of such material in making
judicial determinations, Justice Brandeis stated that a judicial opinion derives
authority, just as law derives its existence, from all facts of life.' 44 "A . . . judge is
free to draw upon these facts wherever he can find them, if only they are helpful."'4 5
The people then, and their "speak," cannot be fully represented on the face of
laws and regulations nor captured by the legislative process which brings them into
existence. Rather, the dynamic nature of the deliberative process (from which the
people's speak emanates) in creating and entrenching the super statute, is part and
parcel of the law and any agency regulations, rules, and decisions derived from it.
As such, that speak must be part of the court's analysis when rights conferred by a
super statute are implicated.
II. THE EMPEROR AND HIS CLOTHES: THE
INSTITUTIONAL CLOAK OF DEFERENCE

While Chevron "encapsulates the relationship between the courts, the agencies,
and Congress in administering and interpreting statutes,"14 it relies too heavily on
the assumption that Congress fully represents the people's will. The ultimate effect
is that Chevron deference allows courts to leave the people's will out of its analysis
and deprives the people of an opportunity to be heard regarding agency decisions
and regulations. The very existence of parties in litigation suggests that some aspect
of the normative debate has malfunctioned. According to Eskridge and Ferejohn,
"judicial review might be the only mechanism available for jump-starting
institutions of public deliberation that are broken.""'
The Chevron doctrine encompasses two steps in determining whether agencies
have tread too far in their actions according to the statutes under which they
operate. That two-step process requires that the court first determine whether
Congress has, through the statute's language, spoken clearly with regard to the
agency action at issue.1 4 8 If Congress' intent is clear, there is no need to move on to
the second step, which determines whether the agency's action is based on a
permissible construction of the statute under which it gets it power.1 49 The result
supra note 34, at 35.
143 Id. at 36 (discussing the proliferation of amicus filings by interests groups in Supreme Court
142 DEVINS & FISHER,

cases).
144 Id.

145 Id.; William H. Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 Am. L. Rev. 641, 643 (1895) ("In
so far as fear of public comment does not affect the courage of a judge but only spurs him on to search
his conscience and to reach the result which approves itself to his inmost heart, such comment serves
useful purpose."); but cf DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 35 (explaining Congressman Wright
Patman's admonition against relying on articles, books, and reports declaring judicial use of such
material improper because the studies contained within such reports are not objective and are set for the
express purpose of skewing the court's judgment to the their particular viewpoint).
146 TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41260, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN

PAUL STEVENS: THE CHEVRONDOCTRINE 2 (2010).
147 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 23.
141
149

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
Id. at 842-43.
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of this is that deference to agency action and interpretation under the statute
becomes the default and independent judgment is reserved for special occasions
narrowly defined and inconsistently applied.'s
Prior to Chevron, courts employed a multiple factors test in determining
whether to defer to agency statutory interpretation.1 s' These factors operated
under a sliding scale and while there were decisions made at the polar extremes
during this time - where agency view was completely ignored or completely
dispositive,
the Court might embrace a particular interpretation (1) because it was supported
by the language of the text, (2) because it was consistent with the legislative
history, and (3) because it was the longstanding construction of the administrative
agency.1

52

Under this scheme, independent judicial judgment was the default rule - not
deference.s3 "Deference to agency interpretation was appropriate only if a court
could identify some factor or factors that would supply an affirmative justification
for giving special weight to agency views."154
While the Chevron scheme seemed to offer a way to provide guidance where
there was seemingly none before, it actually made deference an all or nothing
proposition thus eliminating the sliding scale factor analysis of the past.'s In
Chevron, Justice Stevens wrote that Congress is the ultimate lawmaking authority
5
of the land.s'
If Congress has spoken clearly on an issue, then the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to that intent.'7 Under this democratic theory, Justice
Stevens reasoned that if the statutory language is unclear, the gap filler in
determining its meaning should be the agency, which derives its power directly
from Congress.' The agency, if it is in fact operating in a permissible way,
represents the people's will because the agency is created by Congress and Congress

iso See Merrill, supra note 41, at 977; see also Abigail R. Moncrief, Reincarnating the "Major
Questions" Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Non-Interference (Or Why
Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60 Admin. L. Rev. 594, 596 (2008) (arguing that the "major
questions" exception, which allows courts to bypass Chevron deference to agency action involving major
economic and political questions, should be reincarnated and reconceptualized after the Court did not
invoke it when faced with a major issue in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); but cf. King v.
Burwell, 576 U.S. - at 8 (2015) where the Court essentially resurrects the major questions exception by
refusing to apply Chevron deference calling the matter an extraordinary one that gives "reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress" meant for the agency to resolve any ambiguity in the statute.
(emphasis added)
' Merrill, supra note 41, at 972.
152 Id. The factors were not always applied consistently but according to Merrill, this was no
different than the way courts applied statutory interpretation cannons. Id. at 972-73.
I Id. at 972.
154 Id.
1ss Id. at 977.
15' Merrill, supra note 41, at 978 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
1s7 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
1ss Id. at 843; Merrill, supra note 41, at 978.
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is elected by the people. This accountability syllogism thus serves as the
justification for applying Chevron deference to agency action. However, this
positions Congress and agency appointees as the ultimate interpreters thus trapping
a statute's development in a web of analysis and review that never captures the
people's will beyond what can be measured from electoral participation and rule
promulgation procedures.' Thus, an over-reliance on Congress and agencies to
represent the people's will could in fact block it from reaching the court and, with
respect to the HEA, result in decisions that retrench the underlying policy of the
statute.
A. Participation
Section 1098a(a)(1) of the United States Code requires that the DOE obtain
public involvement in the development of proposed regulations to implement
programs under Title IV of the HEA prior to publishing.' Arguably, this
mandate is satisfied during the administrative process through the negotiated
rulemaking mechanism that accompanies promulgation of an agency regulation.'
Negotiated rulemaking supplements the notice and comment feature of agency
rulemaking.' 62 It brings together various stakeholders representing constituencies
that would be impacted by the proposed regulation.' The negotiated rulemaking
committee meets publicly to assess the data, laws, and policies related to the
proposed regulation in an effort to reach consensus.' 64 If the committee reaches
consensus, the agency adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then
proceeds to the notice and comment portion of the process.'
Negotiated rulemaking was introduced as a way to remedy the time and
expense associated with agency rule promulgation.' Those favoring it highlighted
the fact that the negotiation process would take place before an agency issued a
proposed regulation and thus the fights that often ensued after publishing notice of
the rule would be eliminated.'16 In fact, proponents of negotiated rulemaking not
only favored it because it would make the rulemaking process go more smoothly by
eliminating controversy and fights, but in doing so, it would also ward off judicial
review challenges.1 6 s Once promulgated, the regulation would be less likely to
159 See generally DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at
40 (describing Congress' role as ultimate
interpreter as the result of increased need for constitutional interpretation and "the Supreme Court's
willingness to defer to elected government" on interpretation matters).
o 20 U.S.C. § 1098a (a) (1) (2012).
See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
RuleMaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1256 (1997).
162 Id. at 1256.
163 Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance ofNegotiatedRulemaking, 9
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 (2000).
" Id. at 33; Coglianese, supra note 161, at 1257.
16 Coglianese, supra note 161, at 1257.
'6 Id. at 1262.
167 Id. at 1256, 1262.
168 Id. at 1262-63.
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generate subsequent conflict and litigation if developed through a process that
sought consensus of the effected parties at the outset.' However, this reliance on
consensus and collaboration at the rulemaking level to represent the people's will is
misplaced. 70 It assumes those chosen to participate in the negotiated rulemaking
process truly represent the people and ignores the reality that participation in that
process or in any arena can be thwarted by socio-economic status and elite
stimulus.171

In June of 2010, the DOE Secretary published a notice of proposed
rulemaking.1 72 The Secretary noted that the purpose of the regulations would be to
strengthen and improve the administration of programs authorized to receive
federal funds under the HEA.17 1
After the regulations were eventually published, the Association of Private
Sector Colleges and Universities ("APSCU") responded by filing suit against the
DOE alleging, among other things, that the rulemaking process was procedurally
flawed regarding some of the regulations published. 174 The DOE conducted a
series of public hearings and three negotiated rulemaking sessions. 75 It chose
non-federal negotiator representatives from each group involved in the student
financial assistance programs authorized by Title IV of the HEA.'
The APSCU argued that the negotiated rulemaking sessions were not
conducted properly and were abandoned too soon after consensus was not reached
initially. 77 The APSCU did acknowledge that the sessions properly focused on the
issues that significantly impact for-profit schools.' 78 However, the APSCU claimed
that the negotiators participating in the negotiated rulemaking sessions did not
adequately represent for-profit schools as there was only one representative from
the sector on the negotiating team.1 79 When sector representatives requested more
representation, the necessary consensus for approving that request was not
achieved.so The APSCU argued that the rulemaking process was further flawed
because the DOE undermined the process by advancing proposals that would never
be agreeable to certain negotiators and thus a failure to reach consensus was a
Id.
But see Michael Herz, Some Thoughts on Judicial Review and Collaborative Governance, 2009
J. DISP. RESOL. 361, 368-69 (stating that negotiated rulemaking proponents trust the process because it
mimics some elements of popular decision making values found in the legislative process and thus its
outcomes are often deemed "right" and appropriate for highly deferential judicial review).
"' See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 4, 21 (arguing that political leaders drive who participates
and that invitations to participate are socially structured and political).
172 Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,832 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codified in
scattered parts of 34 C.F.R.).
173 Id.
174 Complaint at 12, 14, 39, Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. &Univs. v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 108
(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00138).
17 Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. at 66,833.
176 Id.
117 Complaint at 12-13.
17s Id. at 12.
179 Id.
o Id.
169

1o
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natural result.' 8 ' After consensus was not reached initially, the DOE did not begin
additional negotiated rulemaking sessions, but rather moved on to the notice-andcommenting procedures before eventually issuing proposed regulations.18 2
The court did not address the full breath of the APSCU's arguments regarding
the negotiated rulemaking process. It did, however, strike a portion of one
regulation because the DOE failed to properly notify and provide an opportunity to
comment on a rule change regarding that regulation.'
While the APSCU arguably has more resources and connections than the
average citizen in ensuring its participation in negotiated rulemaking, its arguments
reveal the inherent problems in using the results of such processes as a proxy for the
people's will. These problems are magnified when considering the average citizen
as negotiated rulemaking incorrectly assumes notice of opportunities to participate
actually reaches the people and that they are "elitely stimulated" enough to search
for them when they do not.18 4 In terms of being a reliable source of and guiding
the agency as to the people's will, this is the essential drawback of negotiated
rulemaking. Like the legislative process, negotiated rulemaking is prone to defects
in purporting to represent the people's will and thus the outcomes from it should
face strenuous judicial review.18 5
B. Collaboration
Processes such as negotiated rulemaking promote and highlight collaboration
and not the deliberation necessary to keep entrenched statutes and their underlying
policies afloat.'"' Arguments in favor of collaboration suggest that legislation is
legitimated by the legislators' democratic mandate."' Courts should thus review
collaborative governance as an extension of legislation and accept the outcome of
such processes as long as they can determine they were bona fide.'" But what
makes them bona fide leaves a big question.
Collaboration suggests compromise in that all sides get some portion of what
they desire. This compromise leads to confusion about the people's will regarding
maintenance of an entrenched super statute. If one side determines that the statute
can be used to suggest fiscal austerity (protection of federal financial aid funds) and
the other side determines that the statute can be used for social justice (education
access), then how the statute is managed depends on what side is in control."' The
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
" Ass'n of Private Sector Coils. & Univs. v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 113, 133 (D.D.C. 2011).
'8
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 4, 18, 21 (describing participation as structured and
highlighting findings which prove that socio-economic status and elite stimulus drive who participates).
185 Herz, supra note 170, at 365-67.
116 See id. at 368.
187 See id. at 365-66.
"' See id.
.. See Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Justice Rehnquist, in a
dissent, stated that an agency may adjust its programs to be in line with the philosophy of a new
administration within the bounds set by Congress). Justice Rehnquist found no trouble with an agency's
181

182
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people speak and thus express their will by voting for who should have that control,
but political elections are not about the people's will as much as they are about
constructing issues in a way that would allow the people to vote for a particular
side. 9 o What's more, this varied issue approach promoted by compromise actually
can confuse the people's will even more and provide a ready opportunity for
politicians to obfuscate the real issues in place of those more fashionable or
palatable for election purposes. Therefore, collaboration does not necessarily
represent the people's will as much as it represents political maneuvering at best
and obfuscation at worst.19
Collaboration is thus not the key to legitimizing agency decisions.' 92
Deliberation is. Normative debate deliberation narrows and expands the statute
that governs agency action while it takes into account the people's will. The very
nature of deliberation under the normative debate construct suggests compromise
and the need for consensus. But, in the normative debate context, deliberation has
a real time quality. Within this scheme, the statute and its application is tested and
then narrowed or constructed according to what those tests reveal about the
people's will. This constant revisiting of the statute is set apart from collaboration,
which is often a "one shot" deal. Deliberation, on the other hand, engages the
people in shaping and molding the statute as the people's needs change. The
functional entrenchment of the HEA, through its multiple reauthorizations since
1965, serve as an example of how deliberation rises above collaboration and
consensus and actually transforms an ordinary statute into a super statute.19' Thus,
the judiciary must consider more than whether the people met and agreed. The
judiciary must also consider what the people say through their social movements,
interest group participation, and publications about the right provided and
protected by the super statute. This is what must influence the court's review of
agency action with regard to super statutes.

repeal of a regulatory policy issued by Democrats once Republicans succeeded them in office. Herz,
supra note 170, at 369. President Ronald Reagan, the Republican president who took office, ran a
campaign promising deregulation. Id. Since that was a campaign promise and President Reagan was
democratically elected on that promise, the agency's change was predictable, understandable, reasonable,
and therefore legal. Id.
190 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, at 21 ("Issues alone do not mobilize citizens to political activity.
Political leaders recruit citizens to political activity for political reasons.").
11 See Kevin D. Vinson & E. Wayne Ross, WVhat We Can Know and When We Can Know It, Z
MAGAZINE (Mar. 1, 2001), https://zcomm.org/zmagazine/what-we-can-know-and-when-we-canknow-it-by-kevin-d-vinson/ (stating that education policy is being crafted in a milieu of standards
achieved by a consensus of liberal and conservative players).
192 See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 ("[T]hat a ... procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it .... " "Convenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic government....").
193 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 17-18 (stating that the "central procedural feature
of constitutional entrenchment is repeated legislative refinement and reaffirmation of the institutions
.").
over ... time ...
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C. ReasonedAnalysis
As noted above, in January of 2011, the APSCU filed suit against the DOE.19 4
In this same lawsuit, the APSCU argued that the DOE's regulations regarding
compensation and recruitment, misrepresentation of institutional information, and
state authorization were arbitrary and capricious.19 5
The APSCU argued that the compensation regulations were arbitrary and
capricious because they directly contradicted regulatory history, increased
regulatory uncertainty, were not supported by reasoned explanation for their
implementation, were not supported by required economic analysis, and did not
consider less harmful regulatory alternatives."' Congress amended the HEA in
1992 to prohibit educational institutions qualifying under Title IV "from providing
'any commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on
success in securing enrollments or financial aid.""" According to the APSCU, this
provision was confusing to implement amongst all the stakeholders (DOE,
for-profit institutions, traditional public and private institutions, etc.).' This led to
the clarifying regulations which, according to the APSCU, provided interpretive
guidance and bright-line rules that were easy for parities to understand and allowed
the DOE and the courts to easily pinpoint improper compensation schemes.'
The APSCU argued that, in promulgating the 2010 regulations, the DOE
ignored past regulatory confusion, repealed the clarifying regulations, and replaced
them with the compensation regulations, which extended the statutory
compensation restriction beyond its congressionally defined scope.200
The
compensation regulations, argued the APSCU, were inconsistent with the HEA
because they extended to employees not covered by the statutory terms, including
college presidents and other administrative officials. 20 1 The APSCU argued further
that the compensation regulations provided no guidance as to how to safely, and
without regulatory risk, compensate employees engaged in recruiting, admissions,
financial aid counseling, and supervision of those areas.2 02 The APSCU also argued
that the DOE offered no reasoned explanation for replacing the clarifying
regulations with the compensation regulations.20 3
The HEA prohibits institutions receiving Title IV funds from engaging in
"substantial misrepresentations" regarding the educational programs, financial
Complaint, supra note 174.
..
sId. at 37.
196 Id.
1 Id. at 15 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a) (20) (2012)).
'9s See id. at 16-17.
'9 Id. at 16-18.
2' Id. at 18-19.
201 Id. at 21 (stating, that "the actions of a college president could potentially come within the
HEA's prohibition on the payment of incentive compensation" (quoting Program Integrity Issues, 75
Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,874 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codified in scattered parts of 34 C.F.R.)).
202 Id. at 22.
3
Id. at 23.
194
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charges, or the employability of graduates.2 04 The APSCU argued that the
misrepresentation regulations were too broad in referring to all institutional
statements and not just statements made pertaining to the institution's educational
programs, its financial charges, or the employability of its graduates. 205 The
regulations were also overly broad in defining misrepresentation.206 The APSCU
argued that this broadening was capricious in that it denoted as misleading not only
false statements, but also any statement that has the likelihood or tendency to
confuse regardless of the speaker's intentions. 207 If schools are found to have made
such statements, their eligibility under Title IV of the HEA to receive federal
financial aid funds could be jeopardized.2 08 The APSCU argued that the
misrepresentation regulations were arbitrary and capricious in that they did not
provide reasoned explanation as to why institutions should not be afforded due
process if they violate these regulations.209
Finally, the APSCU argued that the state authorization regulations were
arbitrary and capricious because they did not identify any tangible harm to be
averted or benefit to be gained by their implementation, were not the product of
reasoned analysis, provided no safety net for schools which were found to not be in
compliance, and did not consider the impact of the regulations on schools offering
distance or online education. 210
The HEA requires that an institution of higher education be legally authorized
within each state to provide a program of education beyond secondary education. 21 1
The APSCU argued that, prior to the 2010 state authorization regulations, the
DOE did not define nor provide any guidance as to how states could specifically
authorize an institution to provide a program beyond secondary education. 212
Under the state authorization regulations, states would have to establish a scheme
for authorizing schools receiving Title IV HEA funds and to provide, within those
schemes, a mechanism by which complaints concerning schools could be reviewed
and applicable regulations could be enforced.21 3 Schools would have to be
authorized expressly by name to provide post-secondary education and not deemed
simply an entity doing business within a state.214 According to the APSCU, such
204

Complaint, supra note 174, at 26 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1094(c) (3) (A) (2012)).

205 Id. at 27.
206 Id. The APSCU also argued that the HEA requires that punishable misrepresentations be

substantial. Id. at 28. The regulations define a "substantial misrepresentation" as "[a]ny
misrepresentation on which the person to whom it was made could reasonably be expected to rely, or
has reasonably relied, to that person's detriment." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Thus,
argued the APSCU, an institution could lose its Title IV eligibility if, in the view of the DOE or a
court, the statement has a tendency to confuse or even if the statement is true and the statement was
never relied on. Id.
207 Id. at 2, 28.
208

Id. at 26 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 668.71(a) (2011)).

209 Id. at 37.
210 Id. at 38.

Id. at 31 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2012)).
Id. at 31-32.
213 Id. at 32.
214 Id. The APSCU notes that "[s]tates may exempt certain types of accredited schools and schools
211
212
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requirements would impose great and unnecessary burdens on institutions offering
online and innovative distance learning programs.215
In its analysis of the APSCU's claims, the court set out the various scenarios
under which Chevron deference would or would not apply. The court noted that if
the Chevron step one search for Congress' unambiguous statutory intent bears no
fruit, the court moves on to the second step.2 16 Chevron's second step requires a
court to determine the level of deference to give to the agency's interpretation.217
The court stated that Chevron deference applies to an agency's promulgation of its
own interpretation through notice and comment rulemaking. 2 s The court
continued by stating that it must "determine whether

...

[the

agency's]

interpretation is permissible or reasonable, giving controlling weight to the agency's
interpretation unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."219
With regard to the compensation regulations, the court held that the DOE
supplied reasoned analysis in repealing the clarifying regulations and adopting the
compensation regulations.220 The court stated that the DOE, based on its expertise,
explained that the safe harbors under the clarifying regulations did "more harm
than good" and eliminating them would bring the regulations and conduct in line
with the statute.22 ' The court reasoned that the law does not require the best
choice - only a reasonable choice. 222 The court also found that the senior
management compensation regulations, prohibiting senior level employees engaged
in recruiting, admissions, or awarding financial aid from receiving incentive
payments, were permissible under the HEA. 223 In making this determination, the
court looked to the plain meaning of the word "engaged."224 The court held that
the "definitions reveal no flaw in the Secretary's regulation" and the HEA does not
exempt senior management from such a rule.2 25 The court held further that the
DOE Secretary, in light of broader concerns, did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
in promulgating the regulations. 22 6
The court deferred to the DOE's interpretation regarding the misrepresentation
regulations' scope. 227 The court referenced the DOE's post promulgation Dear
Colleague Letter which limited misrepresentation to "statements concerning
that have been in operation within the [s]tate for more than twenty years." Id. "Tribal and religious
schools meeting certain requirements are also exempt." Id.
215 See id. at 32.
216 Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D.D.C. 2011).
217 Id.
21

Id.

219

Id
220 Id. at 122.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 122-23.
2 Id. at 123.
224 Id.
22s Id. at 123.
226
227

Id. at 124.
Id. at 126.
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educational programs, financial charges, and employability."' The court held that
the definitions were specific enough to provide a materiality requirement to the
misrepresentation definition and cited the DOE's continued commitment to
reasonably consider all the facts and circumstances around any alleged
misrepresentation. 229 The court also deferred to the DOE's interpretation regarding
the definition of substantial misrepresentation. 230 The court held that the
regulations defining substantial misrepresentation were reasonable and that the
Secretary did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in promulgating them. 231 The court
noted that "since the ... [DOE's] focus is on worthwhile education and the funding
and repayment of federal monies, the Court cannot say the Secretary acted
unreasonably by omitting an intention to deceive or confuse from its definition of
misrepresentation...."232

The court declined to address the DOE's authority to promulgate the state
authorization regulations.2 33 The court did however strike a portion of the statutory
authorization regulations because the DOE did not properly conduct notice and
comment regarding a change to that particular provision. 234
Few would question the DOE's ability and mandate to promulgate regulations
that foster access to higher education. 23 5 But, the court's seemingly automatic
deference to the DOE's decision to promulgate these precise regulations without
studying the people's will to determine if they fall in line with the underlying
purpose of the HEA is troubling. The court did take a "hard look" at the
regulations in reviewing them for reasonableness. 6 But, this review was not "hard"
enough to capture the people's will on the matter as it focused more on language
constructs and statutory permissions for DOE action. The court did not fully
consider how the regulations might impact people's access to higher education. In
today's climate of fiscal austerity and commodified higher education schemes, it is
not difficult to find reasonableness in the DOE's regulations. In the APSCU case,
the court referenced the access purpose behind the HEA but did not consider what
access would mean for today's citizen in light of the promulgated regulations.23 7
Id.
2 Id. at 129.
230 Id. at 128.
231 Id.
2 Id. at 128
233 Id. at
234 Id. at 133-35.
235 See id. at 113 (citing 20 U.S.C. 1070 (a) (2012)(stating that the purpose of Title
IV is to "assist
in making available the benefits of post-secondary education to eligible students ... ").
236 In Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 46, 57 (1983), the Court declined to
give deference to agency action and held that the National Highway Traffic Administration acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in changing motor vehicle safety requirements without providing a reasoned
analysis supporting that the change was in the public's best interest. Search for reasoned analysis became
known as the hard look approach. Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the "HardLook"Doctrine, 7
Nev. L. J. 151, 158 (2006). According to Garry, the hard look approach provides a "substantive check
on agency power" ensuring that "agency decisions serve the public interest." Id. at 152-53.
237 Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2011); see
generallyOsamudia R. James, BreakingFree ofChevron's Constraints- Zuni Public School District No.
228
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The court did not consider whether the DOE, in an attempt to weed out the bad
actors, might have also created an unworkable situation for the good actors
(traditional and for-profit institutions alike) who provide meaningful higher
education opportunities.m
The APSCU case illustrates the impact of a review scheme that defaults to
agency deference. This creates a slope too slippery for ensuring that agency action
is in line with the underlying purpose of entrenched super statutes such as the
HEA.239 Again, the goal here is not to suggest that every plaintiff complaining
about DOE action should win. Rather, this case demonstrates how the deference
scheme allows a court to bypass considering the people's will when reviewing
agency action, thereby removing itself from accessing and thus participating in the
normative debate. Studies, investigations, and reports have shown that the forprofit sector's reliance on financial aid funds leaves many of its students with
disproportionately high debt and loan defaults which increase the burden on tax
payers.24 Studies also indicate that the students affected most disproportionately
are "African American and Hispanic ... [thereby] furthering the persistent racial
divide in higher education."241 The DOE's rules attempt to protect access by
addressing for-profit schools' unscrupulous acts. But, the purpose of the HEA is
also to foster access - to provide access to meet the needs of today's student. By
not considering the people's speak in judging the reasonableness of the DOE's
89 v. U.S. Department of Education, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 148 (2007) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's application of Chevron to DOE action (that ultimately resulted in compromising the ability of
two school districts in New Mexico to address the unique learning needs of Native American students in
the districts) as constraining and producing an outcome misaligned with congressional intent).
" See Thomas L. Harnisch, Changing Dynamics in State Oversight of For-Profit Colleges,
American
Association
of
State
Colleges
and
Universities,
April
2012
9
http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/PolicyPublications/P
olicyMatters/Changing%20Dynamics%20in%20State%200versight%20of%20ForProfit%20Colleges.pdf (stating that the regulations apply to all of American post-secondary education
and explaining that large for-profit college networks have the resources to navigate the state
authorization web whereas most schools that are non-compliant are public institutions and established
private not for-profit institutions).
239 See Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 447-453 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
where the court of appeals reversed the lower court's ruling regarding some portions of the regulations
calling the court's deference improper in those instances where the DOE failed to provide reasoned
analysis or acted outside the permissible bounds of the HEA.
Although the court of appeals seems to force more reasoned analysis in some instances, this may
only be one step above the perfunctory explanation originally offered by the DOE. For example, the
court of appeals held that DOE failed to provide reasoned analysis in response to comments regarding
the incentive pay compensation regulations' impact on minority recruitment. Id. at 449. In response to
these concerns, the DOE stated that compensation regulations " . . . apply to all employees . . . engaged
in any student recruitment, admission activity, or [financial aid decisions]." Id. The court noted that the
DOE's failure to address these concerns or its conclusory approach to them was "fatal to its defense." Id.
However, the court mentioned that the DOE's answer fell just short and it would be a simple matter to
address these concerns on remand. Id.
2" Bridget Ansel, The ChangingDynamics of Economic Inequality and For-Profit Universities,
Washington Center for Equitable Growth, http://equitablegrowth.org/news/changing-dynamicseconomic-inequality-profit-universities/ (November 21, 2014).
241 Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 103; Ansel, supra note 240.
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actions, the court, in the APSCU case, missed an opportunity to examine the
regulations' impact on continued higher education access for the very students most
susceptible to and affected by the unscrupulous actors. "Judicial review should be
deliberation-respecting-which it cannot easily be if judges refuse to consider the
deliberative materials."2 4 2
III. BUT THE EMPEROR HAS ON NOTHING AT ALL: "DE-CLOAKING" AND
DECONSTRUCTING DEFERENCE TO AGENCY
ADMINISTRATION OF SUPER STATUTES

The current scheme for reviewing agency action regarding a super statute must
be "de-cloaked" and exposed for what it is - a language debate that does not
consider the people's will.2 43 While it is true that statutes delegating "authority to
administrative agencies are different ... [as] Congress may delegate ... not only the
authority to implement the statute but, implicitly, the authority to interpret it as
well,"2 4 4 this construct ignores that even within this subset of statutes, there are
differences. Statutes that agencies are allowed to implement and interpret may also
be super statutes entrenching important rights society has come to expect and
depend upon.2 45 Those statutes cannot be subject to an all or nothing deferential
interpretive approach when agency action involving them comes into question.2 46
Because super statutes represent a codification of rights-claiming activity by
citizens, courts should consider not just what Congress may have meant by its
statutory language but also what the people meant, through the normative debate
process in entrenching the statute.2 4 7 To determine whether a super statute clearly
allows agency action, courts must consider all that has driven and maintained the
statute's super status-the text, congressional intent, the purpose for which the
statute was created, the social condition, and actual existing records of the people's
will. 2 48 These make up and influence the normative debate and thus the judiciary
must consider it.
That courts will engage in judicial review of agency decisions sometimes-or,
according to Thomas Merrill, more times than they apply Chevron

242 ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN,

supra note 7, at 266.

243 See Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron Deference
Apply?, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 1069, 1083 (2000) (step one of Chevron application has turned into

"dictionary battles" to determine what Congress meant via its statutory language).
24 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron'sMistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 550-51 (2009).
245 See Johnson, supra note 7, at 547 (noting that super statutes represent rights-claiming advocacy
from citizens where citizens "pressure politicians to provide something they expect and deem essential").
246 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 293 ("Judges ... ought to hew closely to the text
and give it stingy readings for ordinary statutes, but for super statutes judges ought to be attentive to
small "c" constitutional purpose, as well as competing constitutional norms.").
7
1 SeeJohnson, supra note 7, at 547.
2 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 292-93; DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 34, at 35
(stating that interest groups publish "articles, books, and commission reports" to "publicize their
findings about important matters").
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deference 249-offers little solace. The reality is that the existence of this deference,
along with potential judicial activism amongst the courts, leaves challengers in a bit
of limbo regarding what kind of deference will be afforded to agency decisions. 2so
The best way to simultaneously end this confusion and to involve the court in
interpretative exercises beyond purely language and dictionary battleS 251 is to create
a deference exception for entrenched super statutes. This approach would recognize
the importance of super statutes and solidify them as legislation that codifies and
protects a right that Congress could not have meant to leave solely to the discretion
of an agency.2 52 To accomplish this, the judiciary could use a major questions
exception to the Chevron deference approach. 2s3 The major questions exception
adds an additional step to the Chevron construct-a pre-beginning step-by
considering whether the agency action in question deserves deference.254 This "step
zero" approach serves as an "initial inquiry into whether Chevron [deference]
applies at all." 25 5 This question is only answered affirmatively if the agency action
involves or implicates "major" economic or political questions - those that
Congress could not have meant to leave solely to an agency.25 6
This exception to Chevron deference, with some modification, can be applied
to agency action pursuant to an entrenched super statute.257 Instead of beginning
249 See Merrill, supra note 41, at 970; see ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 266 (stating
that interpretive semantics allow "activist judges to disrupt" on track "administrative constitutionalism"

and "'do-nothing' judges to tolerate constitutionalism that is off track, but within the letter of vague
statutory directives").
250 See Choo, supra note 243, at 1082, 1084; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev.
187, 190 (noting that the judiciary's move to pre Chevron law in its attempt to establish its primacy as
well as the addition of several "epicycles to the Chevron framework has led to uncertainty about the
appropriate approach").
2s1 Id. (arguing that Chevron deference has been weakened by judges' frequent attempts to discern
Congress' intent through "dictionary battles" and the use of more available legislative interpretative
resources).
252 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (stating that, in the
context of determining whether Congress meant that the Food and Drug Administration could regulate
tobacco products, the court "must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an
administrative agency").
253 See Moncrief, supra note 150, at 596 (describing the major questions exception, which allows
courts to bypass Chevron deference to agency action involving major economic and political questions,
and arguing that it be reincarnated after the Court effectively overruled it by failing to apply it to a major
question in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)); cE City of Arlington, Texas v. Federal
Communication Commission et al., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (stating that the premise that there is
a distinction between big important interpretations and run of the mill ones is false as the only question
a court faces when confronted with agency interpretation of a statute it administers is always simply
whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of statutory authority); but cf King v. Burwell, 576
U.S. _ at 8 (2015) (arguably resurrecting the major questions exception by not applying Chevron
deference to Internal Revenue Service action regarding the Affordable Care Act).
254 Moncrief, supra note 150, at 597-98.
255 Sunstein, supra note 250, at 191.
256 Moncrief, supra note 150, at 598 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120 (2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) as examples of the Court
denying deference to agency action concerning issues of major "economic and political significance").
257 See generally Moncrief, supra note 150, at 598 (discussing agencies' non-interference with
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by determining whether agency action implicates major economic or political
questions, the court would first determine whether the agency is acting pursuant to
an entrenched super statute. To do this, the court would consider whether the
statute in question codifies a right or collection of rights that society expects and
has come to depend on.258 In doing so, the court would decide whether the statute
provides a quasi-constitutional right - one so important and necessary to citizens'
pursuit of happiness that agency action which potentially comes into conflict with
that right must be reviewed.2 59
The court would then proceed to the next step - determining whether that
action invoked major economic or political questions in relation to the super statute
that would render deference to agency action inappropriate.260 In City of Arlington
Texas v. Federal Communication Commission et al.,261 the Court noted that
Chevron's foundation is greatly supported by the assumption that any ambiguity
left by Congress in the enabling legislation is to be resolved first and foremost by
the agency.2 62 This assumption is rooted in Congress' power to delegate to
agencies and the agencies role as expert on the subject matter. But this assumes
that Congress alone truly represents the people's will and that agencies have done
their due diligence in discovering it. Electoral issue manipulation as well as
administrative notice and participation procedures that do not give all the
opportunity to participate puts this assumption into question. Thus, elections and
administrative processes cannot serve as the sole proxies for the people's will when
reviewing agency action pursuant to a super statute. The judiciary must take the
matter up anew and consider the impact of the agency action on the people. 263 In
doing so, a no-deference standard would be established for agency action involving
major economic or political questions regarding rights granted by super statutes.
One criticism of the major questions exception is that there is no clear standard
for when to apply it-there is no "mechanism for categorizing future major
Congressional action as a basis for reinstating the exception after Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) arguably weakened it by not addressing it when confronted with a question of major economic
and political significance).
258 SeeJohnson, supra note 7, at 547.
259
See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 283 ("When important normative issues of
constitutional or (quasi-constitutional) significance are involved in agency interpretation cases, the
justices may talk deference, but they perform their normative role to the hilt.").
260 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. _ at 21 (2015) (Justice Roberts stated that "Congress passed the
Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we
must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter."); see Einer
Elhauge, Symposium: Economics Beats Formalism, Supreme Court of the United States Blog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-economics-beats-formalism/ (June 25, 2015)(stating
that the King decision confirms Chevron's limits when applied "to questions of deep 'economic and
political significance'").
261 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
262 City of Arlington, Texas v. Federal Communication Commission et al., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868
(2013).
263
See David Baake, Obituary: Chevron's Major Questions Exception (August 27, 2013) 3,
https://journals.law.harvard.edulelr/2013/08/27/obituary-chevrons-major-questions-exception/
(likening the major questions exception to de novo review of agency interpretations with major political
or economic significance).
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questions cases."2 64 This concern is neutralized when considering entrenched super
statutes. Because super statutes, by their nature, represent those rights which have
become entrenched in societal expectations through the normative debate process,
the court may access that "normative debate record" to determine whether the
agency action is pursuant to a super statute that preserves such a right. This
includes case precedent, studies on the matter, amicus curiae briefs, publications,
and other evidence of the social condition. By accessing these things, the court
could take a broad purposive-like look at the statute when addressing agency
action.2 65 According to Eskridge and Ferejohn, deliberation is purposive because it
considers solutions "to a ... [problem] in light of larger public purposes as well as
their capacity to solve ... [them]."266 Deliberation considers "the costs and benefits
... of different solutions or norms ...

and their correctness with the polity's larger

commitments." 267 The normative debate then, which represents the people's will,
serves as the mechanism for ensuring that a no-deference standard is correctly
applied.
As statutes' entrenched status is recognized, precedent will memorialize the
designation. This would provide notice to the DOE as to how courts will review its
action and prompt it to be more solicitous of a broader study of the people's true
opinion on an issue. It would also potentially provide notice to the people that their
voices will count. This may impact the people's willingness and opportunities to be
heard. Lastly, and most importantly in the context of this article, this scheme
enables the judiciary to become part of the normative debate process by accessing
and understanding the people's will. Determining whether agency action on an
issue should be subject to the no-deference standard will give the court an even
more defined role in the normative debate process. In addition, while the scheme
would not completely dissolve Chevron deference, it would protect the rights
provided by entrenched super statutes from being a victim of its application.
The rights provided by super statutes are too significant for an unpredictable
review scheme. Increasingly, in the context of access to higher education, there is
less consensus amongst various stakeholders as to how and whether the government
should provide and protect that access.268 While some see the government's support
" See Moncrief, supra note 150, at 612.

265 Bressman, supra note 244, at 559 ("[P]urposivists see ...

the inevitable difficulty of capturing all
the aspects or applications of a policy in a relatively few words"). Bressman describes intentionalist,
purposive, and textualist statutory interpretative canonical attempts to reconcile the meaning of
Congress' statutory language. Id. at 559-60. According to Bressman, the adopters of the intentionalist
and purposive canons use legislative history to recover meaning and look for indications of broader
statutory purposes, respectively. Id. at 559. They recognize the difficulty in reconstructing Congress'
activities in promulgating the statute and look for objective evidence in determining the meaning of
congressional language. Id. at 560. Modem textualists, however, regard the legislative process as chaotic
and thus unreliable for the purpose of extracting meaning and thus rely on words' ordinary meaning. Id.
266 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 15.
267 Id.
268 See Johnson, supra note 7, at 568 (stating that the lag time between HEA reauthorizations
signaled an "inability of congressional members to reach consensus" on the government's role in
providing higher education access); see also ST. JOHN, supra note 12, at 1 (arguing that "[tlhe shift in
the burden for paying for college from the government to the student ... has eroded opportunity for low
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of higher education access as a fiscal drain inappropriately shouldered by the
government, others see it as an indispensable government provision that must be
maintained.2 69 The issues before the judiciary regarding higher education access are
not only significant because most consider such access essential to personal and
societal development.27 0 They are also significant because higher education access
poses major economic and political questions that obviously cannot be solved by
Congress and the DOE alone. 2 7' One need only review the slow pace at which the
HEA has been reauthorized to evidence the consistent and seemingly perpetual
inability of legislators to reach an agreement on the administration of the higher
education provision. 272
The judiciary must play its part in recognizing that continued access to higher
education ranks, in significance, alongside freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment under the death penalty, 2 7 3 integrated education systems, 27 4 and
affordable health care275 - all situations where the Court accessed the people's will
and considered the impact laws involving these issues would have on society. The
judiciary has a duty in the normative debate process. That duty requires
participation in the deliberation by reviewing agency action to determine whether
the agency has promulgated or interpreted within the broad purpose of a super
statute as established and entrenched by the people through the normative debate
process. This is not a duty that can be upheld inconsistently. Thus, judicial review
and not deference to agency action should be the norm whenever a super statute is
at issue.
CONCLUSION

"Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment." 276 "In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
2 77

education."

While the Brown Court made this statement in the context of elementary and
income students").
269 Id.
270 See Elhauge, supra note 260 (stating that sheer importance is not enough to secure an exception
to Chevron deference and that the political significance must be clear political conflict).
271 See id.
272 See Johnson, supra note 7, at 565-68 (describing the sluggishness with which the HEA has been
reauthorized since the 1980s).
273 See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 27, at 30-31 for a discussion of the Court's recognition
of

public opinion in its decision to place or moratorium on the death penalty.
274 For a description of the how the Court considered studies regarding the impact of segregation on
young children in striking down school segregation laws, see COTTROL, ET AL., supra note 117.
275 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.
at 8 (2015)(bypassing Chevron deference in its review of
agency action regarding the Affordable Care Act).
276

277

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Id. at 494.
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secondary education, it is still salient when considering the significance of having
access to higher education. Chevron chips away at this ideal. It allows for
retrenchment of a right that has become part of the fabric of society. When
considering agency action regarding access-granting programs and systems, the
judiciary must stop to consider whether the agency's actions support the people's
will and cannot consider that obligation met by virtue of elections and
administrative processes. Leaving that critical determination solely to Congress and
the DOE is not appropriate. If education is the key to success in life, then courts
must review agency action on matters that would impact that. The judiciary must
not be like the Emperor and his subjects who continued to parade about ignoring
the people's calls. It must hear the people when interpreting statutes. The judiciary
must transform its review of agency action into one that considers the normative
debate. That does not limit the court to what Congress might have meant in
enacting a statute or whether the agency is permissibly interpreting the statute.
Rather, it broadens the court's reach to also consider what the people wanted in
conceiving the right granted by the statute and what the people have declared as
their current needs in maintaining their entrenched super statute. The people have
spoken and continue to speak by participating in the normative debate. Now, the
court must consistently and systematically hear them and, by doing so, take its
rightful place at the normative debate table.

